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Abstract 
Background: Previous research has found that in the face of discrimination, people tend to 
identify more strongly with stigmatized groups. Social identification can, in turn, buffer 
wellbeing against the negative consequences of discrimination. However, this rejection 
identification model has never been tested in the context of mental illness identity.  
Methods: A survey was conducted with 250 people with diagnosed depression or current 
symptoms of at least moderate clinical severity.   
Results: Experiencing mental illness stigma was associated with poorer wellbeing. 
Furthermore, people who had experienced such stigma were more likely to identify as a 
depressed person. Social identification as depression magnified, rather than buffered, the 
relationship between stigma and reduced wellbeing. This relationship was moderated by 
perceived social norms of the depressed group for engaging in depressive thoughts and 
behaviors.  
Conclusions: These findings suggest that mental illness stigma is a double-edged sword: as 
well as the direct harms for wellbeing, by increasing identification with other mental illness 
sufferers, stigma might expose sufferers to harmful social influence processes.  
 
 
 
Keywords: mood disorders, mental health, social identity, discrimination, normative 
influence, health behavior.   
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“Depression is who I am”: Mental illness identity, stigma and wellbeing 
People who experience compromised mental health are regularly confronted with 
discrimination – in the workplace, in healthcare settings, and in the community more broadly 
(Corrigan, Druss, & Perlick, 2014; Link, Struening, Rahav, Phelan, & Nuttbrock, 1997; Link, 
Phelan, Bresnahan, Stueve, & Pescosolido, 1999). Research has established that the stigma of 
mental illness actually constitutes a stressor in its own right, with the potential to compound 
mental illness and reduce the likelihood of recovery (Rüsch et al. 2014; Pascoe & Smart 
Richman 2009; Yanos et al. 2010). Although these harmful effects have been established, 
relatively little research has investigated how people with mental illness negotiate their 
stigmatized identity. Those (mainly qualitative) studies that do exist suggest that patients 
often experience depression as self-defining (Karp 1994), and hold self-stigmatizing beliefs, 
for example that depression reflects a weakness of character (Cornford et al. 2007; Boardman 
et al. 2011). Studies have also established that many patients hold a biochemical causal model 
of depression (Lebowitz et al. 2013; Kvaale et al. 2013), and experience difficulties in exiting 
mental illness support groups (Howard, 2008).  
The question of how people negotiate low-status group membership has been the 
focus of research attention in social psychology for over thirty years, albeit with social groups 
other than people with mental illness. This research has revealed a variety of strategies that 
are used to manage low status group memberships (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Chief among 
them is collective action, whereby members of a stigmatized group band together to challenge 
the status quo. However, this social change strategy is only likely to emerge when people 
perceive the low status of their group to be illegitimate (Ellemers et al. 1993; Hansen & 
Sassenberg 2011). When the low status of the group is seen to be legitimate, people are more 
likely to attempt to leave the group through individual mobility strategies, particularly to the 
extent that the boundaries between low and high status groups are perceived to be permeable 
(Ellemers, van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1990). These strategies have implications not only for 
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social and political structure, but also substantial and long-lasting consequences for health 
(Pascoe & Smart Richman, 2009; Schmitt, Branscombe, Postmes, & Garcia, 2014) 
The rejection identification model (RIM; Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999) 
brought attention to the fact that being subject to discrimination due to one’s membership of a 
social group increases the salience of the social identity associated with that social group. For 
example, a woman who experiences workplace discrimination because of her gender is more 
likely to think of herself as a woman, particularly when at work. This social identification, or 
subjective self-definition in terms of a social category, has a number of well-established 
consequences, including for wellbeing. RIM brought attention to the fact that when 
discrimination encourages and enables social identification with a stigmatized group, some of 
the harms of discrimination may be ameliorated. That is, social identifications buffers 
individuals against the negative consequences of stigma. RIM has been investigated in the 
context of ethnic minority identities (Branscombe et al., 1999; Latrofa, Vaes, Pastore, & 
Cadinu, 2009; Schmitt, Spears, & Branscombe, 2003), older people (Garstka, Schmitt, 
Branscombe, & Hummert, 2004), women (Schmitt, Branscombe, Kobrynowicz, & Owen, 
2002) and people with physical disabilities (Fernández, Branscombe, Gómez, & Morales, 
2012), but not, to our knowledge, in the context of mental illness groups. 
RIM is part of a burgeoning body of research demonstrating that social identification 
is the psychological mechanism through which our social reality impacts our individual 
perception, and, ultimately, our wellbeing (Haslam et al, 2009). For instance, people with 
depression who engage in recreational social groups, or group psychotherapy, only 
experience improvement in their symptoms over time to the extent that they identify with the 
group in question (Cruwys, Haslam, Dingle, et al. 2014a). The benefits of social identification 
for health have been demonstrated for a wide array of populations and specific conditions, 
including in pilgrims (Tewari et al. 2012), school children (Turner et al. 2014), people with 
multiple sclerosis (Wakefield et al. 2013), or people who have experienced a traumatic event 
(Jones et al. 2011).  
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However, there has been increasing acknowledgement that we should expect some 
exceptions to this “rule”; that is, some social identities may do more harm than good. A recent 
theoretical review of social identity and depression (Cruwys, Haslam, et al. 2014b) 
hypothesized that the exception to the protective benefits of social identity might be 
stigmatized groups, or those group where social influence by other group members might 
prove harmful to mental health. Specifically, some groups hold norms (the content of a social 
identity) that endorse thoughts or behaviors that are likely to worsen depression symptoms. In 
this case, we might predict that identification would be associated with increased norm 
conformity (Turner, 1991), and thus poorer wellbeing. Very little research has found evidence 
of this to date, however, one recent study found that people in treatment for substance use 
disorder had better outcomes to the extent that they disidentified with previous substance 
using identities (Dingle et al. 2014). One particularly relevant study (Crabtree et al. 2010) 
explored social identification with mental health support groups and the consequences for 
social support, stigma-resistance and self-esteem. Interestingly, while social identification 
was associated with greater perceived support and stigma resistance, this had the effect of 
suppressing an otherwise negative relationship between identification and self-esteem. 
Although not investigating mental illness identity per se, these studies suggest the possibility 
that identification, particularly in the context of stigmatized groups, need not always be 
beneficial for wellbeing.  
People with depression are part of a social category that is both a) subject to stigma 
and discrimination, and b) associated with specific normative thoughts (e.g., hopelessness, 
negativity) and behaviors (e.g., self-harm) that, if internalized by group members, are likely to 
worsen mental health. Therefore this social category represents an ideal test case for the 
theoretical question of whether there are social categories where social identification is 
negatively associated with wellbeing.  Furthermore, depression identity differs from the social 
categories where the RIM has typically been investigated in at least three important ways. 
First, being a “depressed person” is usually concealable, and many people choose not to 
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disclose their diagnosis to others. Previous research has suggested that concealing stigmatized 
identities can be associated with reduced wellbeing (Barretto, Ellemers & Banal, 2006). 
Second, the boundaries between mental illness and mental health are permeable, in that it is 
possible for a person to leave the stigmatized group via recovery– although perhaps not easily 
or quickly. Permeable group boundaries may reduce social identification (Ellemers et al. 
1990). Third, and perhaps most importantly, depression identity describes a person’s lack of 
wellbeing. That is, perhaps more so than any other social category, what it means to be a 
member of the “depressed” group is to experience poor wellbeing. Thus, even if wellbeing is 
operationalized in terms of constructs distinct from depression (such as life satisfaction, 
anxiety, stress), it seems likely that seeing depression as central to one’s identity is 
incompatible with wellbeing.  
The current study 
This study, informed by the social identity approach to health, aimed to investigate 
the relationship between the experience of discrimination, mental illness identity, normative 
influence and wellbeing among people experiencing depression symptomatology. Hypotheses 
one and two were derived from RIM (Branscombe et al., 1999), which has been established 
for a wide variety of stigmatized group memberships, although never with mental illness 
identity:  
H1) Personal experience of discrimination towards “depressed people” will be 
associated with reduced wellbeing (measured as life satisfaction, stress, anxiety symptoms 
and depression symptoms).  
H2) Personal experience of discrimination towards “depressed people” will positively 
predict social identification as a depressed person.  
Two competing hypotheses were proposed regarding the relationship between social 
identification as a depressed person and wellbeing. First, also derived from RIM, we proposed 
a positive relationship between these variables, specifically:  
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H3) Social identification as a depressed person will buffer wellbeing against the 
negative effects of stigma.  
In competition with this, however, and derived from a referent informational 
influence model (Turner, 1991; also H3 of Cruwys et al., 2014b), we proposed a negative 
relationship between these variables, specifically: 
H4) Social identification as a depressed person will predict reduced wellbeing.  
Finally, and also consistent with a referent informational influence account, we 
predicted a negative relationship between social identification and wellbeing only among 
those who perceived a strong norm of depressed thoughts and behaviors among the depressed 
group. Specifically:  
H5) Social identification as a depressed person will interact with perceived symptom 
norms of “depressed people”, such that social identification will be associated with reduced 
wellbeing only among those who characterize people with depression in terms of thoughts 
and behaviors that are consistent with depressive symptomatology.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were recruited widely from psychology clinics, health centers, research 
networks, online depression forums and paid participant pools. People were invited to 
participate if they met the following criteria: “experiencing persistent and intense feelings of 
sadness, people who feel depressed, and people who have been formally diagnosed with 
depression by a health practitioner”. The study was not limited only to those diagnosed with 
depression or currently undergoing treatment because previous evidence suggests that only a 
minority of people with mental illness seek treatment (Goldman et al. 1999), and that these 
are not representative of the mentally ill population (Saxena et al. 2007).  
The final sample included 250 depressed persons, 61.6% of which reported that they 
had received a formal mood disorder diagnosis from a health professional, while the 
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remaining participants reported current depression symptoms of at least moderate severity 
(according to published cut-off criteria; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). Participants without a 
formal diagnosis whose current symptoms were mild or subclinical were excluded from the 
survey (an additional N=60). This was a conservative approach in order to increase our 
confidence that all participants had experienced, or were experiencing, clinical depression 
symptoms. The mean age was 27.37 years (SD=11.64; range 17-70). Participants were 64% 
female and recruited from across the world, with the most common nationalities being United 
States (38.8%), Australia (36.8%), and India (5.6%), with small numbers of participants from 
20 other countries.  
Measures 
Wellbeing 
Wellbeing was assessed using four overlapping but distinct constructs: depression, 
anxiety, stress and life satisfaction. This was to address the potential restriction of range that 
may have resulted from using depression symptoms as both a criteria for eligibility as well as 
a dependent variable. However, as can be seen from Table 1, almost the full range of the scale 
was utilized for all four wellbeing variables.  
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS-21). The DASS-21 is a well-validated 
short form of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (Lovibond & Lovibond 1995). The 
measure includes three seven-item subscales, assessing depression, anxiety, and stress 
symptoms respectively. The DASS has excellent validity in both clinical and non-clinical 
samples and reliability of at least α=.88 (Crawford et al., 2009; Henry & Crawford, 2005). 
For instance, one study with a clinical sample found that the DASS-21 accurately 
distinguishes between individuals with mood disorder, panic disorder or obsessive-
compulsive disorder (Page, Hooke, & Morrison, 2007). Participants were asked to indicate 
how frequently in the preceding week they had experienced symptoms such as “I felt like I 
wasn’t worth much as a person”, (depression subscale, α=.88), “I felt I was close to panic” 
(anxiety subscale, α=.81) and “I tended to over-react to situations” (stress subscale, α=.84) 
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from 0 “Did not apply to me at all” to 3 “Applied to me very much, or most of the time”. For 
each subscale, responses were summed and multiplied by two in accordance with 
recommended practice (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). The mean scores were in “severe” 
range for depression (M=24.92; SD=9.82), the “severe” range for anxiety (M=16.50; 
SD=9.31) and the “moderate” range for stress (M=23.45; SD=9.02).  
Life satisfaction. Life satisfaction was measured using the well-validated 
Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener et al. 1985). Participant rated five items such as “If I 
could live my life over, I would change almost nothing” on a seven-point scale from “Strong 
Disagree” to “Strong Agree” (α=.90). This sample reported low wellbeing on average 
(M=15.83, SD=7.03), approximately equivalent to a clinical outpatient sample at intake 
(Pavot & Diener 1993).   
Social identification 
In recent years, there has been a divergence between the measurement of social 
identification in terms of simple, one-item scales (e.g., “I identify as a depressed person”, 
Postmes, Haslam & Jans, 2012) or in terms of complex, multidimensional constructs (Leach 
et al., 2008). Our view is that, while a single construct is likely to capture social identity 
phenomena in many contexts, it is less appropriate for social categories that have negative 
and stigmatized content (see also Mlicki & Ellemers, 1996; Ouwerkerk, Ellemers, & 
Kortekaas, 1999). More specifically, we hypothesize that the identity centrality dimension 
(“Being depressed is an important part of how I see myself”) might best approximate the 
theoretical component of self-definition, or self-categorization, that is relevant to the 
hypotheses of the present study. Therefore we measured all five dimensions of social 
identification in accordance with the recommendations of Leach and colleagues (2008) and 
made a tentative hypothesis that our hypothesized effects would be most apparent for identity 
centrality. 
Participants responded to 11 items such as “I feel a bond with other people who have 
depression” (identity solidarity, α=.86), “Being part of a group of people who have depression 
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gives me a good feeling” (identity satisfaction, one item only), “The fact that I have 
depression is an important part of my identity” (identity centrality, α=.83), “I am similar to 
the average person who has depression” (identity self-stereotyping, r=.78), and “People who 
have depression have a lot in common with each other” (identity homogeneity, r=.83) on a 
seven-point scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”). Only one item from the 
satisfaction subscale was included in the survey as the other items were judged to have poor 
fit with the depression category (e.g. “It is pleasant to be a depressed person”).1 
Participants were also given the opportunity to provide an optional open-ended 
response to the question “Is depression part of how you see yourself as a person?” 
Perceived discrimination 
Personal experience with discrimination as a depressed person was measured using an 
adapted version of the Perceptions of Discrimination Scale (Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002). 
Participants responded to six items such as “I regularly encounter discrimination against 
people with depression” on seven-point scale from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree” 
(α=.91).  
Symptom norms  
The measure of symptom norms consisted of 4 items adapted from various sources 
(e.g., Cruwys, Haslam, Fox, & McMahon, 2015; Smith & Louis, 2008) that asked participants 
to rate how likely it would be for other people with depression to engage in four kinds of 
symptom-related cognitions (e.g. “Keep thinking negative and unhelpful thoughts”) and 
behaviors (e.g. “Engage in self harm behaviors”) on a seven-point scale from “Very unlikely” 
to “Very likely”. Items were chosen to map directly onto diagnostic criteria. Norms for 
emotional symptoms, such as guilt and sadness, were not directly assessed for this scale, in 
order to minimize conceptual overlap with the wellbeing items. The reliability of the items 
was good (α=.82).   
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Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlations are outlined in Table 1.  
Qualitative responses 
121 participants (48.4%) chose to provide comments in response to the open-ended 
optional question “Is depression part of how you see yourself as a person?” Some participants 
(15.4% of those who provided a valid response) rejected the notion that depression was – or 
should – form part of their self-definition. Often, this included an explicit comparison to a 
physical health condition (e.g., a headache), or an emphasis on the possibility of change or 
recovery. Some examples are:   
“Not at all... I strongly disagree with that phrase, depression should not be used as a 
identity. It is a mental illness but doesn't define who a person is. Associating it with 
who you are would only make it that much difficult to overcome it.” (Female, age 26) 
 “Depression is an illness not a definition of who I am…I am not my illness no more 
than someone with cancer or heart problems are defined by their illness.” (F, 22) 
 “No, I still see myself as a unique individual who is going through a tough time at 
the moment but it is not me in reality.” (F, 57) 
Contrary to this view, however, a much larger group of participants (49% of those 
who provided a valid response) endorsed the notion that depression informed their identity. 
Often, this included reference to the idea that depression shaped their behavior and was 
preoccupying, or an emphasis that depression provided a cogent explanation for their 
subjective experience. Some examples are:  
“Unfortunately depression is now so firmly rooted with me that it is an indelible part 
of my persona. I wouldn't know how to act without depression.” (M, 58) 
 “[Depression] has control over every thing I do, each day. It determines what I will 
and will not do…” (F, 22) 
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“Yes, I always see myself as a generally depressed and unhappy person. I can't 
imagine myself any other way.” (F, 43) 
 “Depression becomes all I can think about myself. Depression becomes all-
consuming.” (M, 42) 
Approximately one third (35.6%) of participants who provided a valid response felt 
ambivalent about identifying as a depressed person, for example:  
“It's hard to see myself without depression, however I don't feel that it defines me.” 
(F, 20) 
“Depression permeates virtually every aspect of my life.  At the same time, I don't 
want depression to define how I see myself as a person. I deal with it. It is a part of 
me, but it is not all that I am. I want to be defined more by the things that give me a 
reason to live and bring fulfillment into my life not by the things that make life hard.” 
(F, 43) 
Evaluation of the hypotheses  
The primary quantitative results are summarized in Figure 1. To assess the first 
hypothesis, concerning a negative relationship between discrimination and wellbeing, four 
separate regression analyses were conducted (one for each dependent variable). Personal 
experience of discrimination predicted lower life satisfaction, F(1,248)=7.76, p=.006, R
2
=.03, 
more depression symptoms, F(1,248)=17.50, p<.001, R
2
=.07, more anxiety symptoms, 
F(1,248)=18.95, p< .001, R
2
=.07, and greater stress, F(1,248)=10.86, p=.001, R
2
=.04. 
Therefore H1 was confirmed: the experience of discrimination as a depressed person was 
associated with poorer wellbeing.  
Similarly, to assess the second hypothesis, concerned a positive relationship between 
discrimination and identification, five separate regression analyses were conducted (one for 
each component of identification). Personal experience of discrimination predicted greater 
identity centrality, F(1,248)=51.07, p<.001, R
2
=.17, greater identity solidarity, 
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F(1,248)=22.70, p<.001, R
2
=.08, greater identity satisfaction, F(1, 247)=12.53, p<.001, 
R
2
=.05, greater perceived identity homogeneity, F(1,248)=12.99, p<.001, R
2
=.05, and greater 
identity self-stereotyping, F(1,248)=16.54, p<.001, R
2
=.06. Therefore H2 was confirmed: the 
experience of discrimination as a depressed person was associated with stronger identification 
as a depressed person. Discrimination was a particularly strong predictor of the centrality of 
depression identity.  
In order to assess the third and fourth hypothesis, Hayes PROCESS (2012, model 4) 
was used. The model included discrimination as the independent variable, the five 
components of identification as mediating variables, and a global wellbeing measure (created 
from the mean of the z-scores of the four separate wellbeing variables, such that high scores 
indicated greater wellbeing) as the dependent variable.
2
 There was no significant indirect 
effect for ingroup homogeneity, ingroup self-stereotyping, identity satisfaction or identity 
solidarity. That is, for these subscales, neither H3 nor H4 were supported; these measures of 
identification were independent of wellbeing. However, identity centrality was a significant 
indirect mediator of the relationship between discrimination and wellbeing. The direction of 
this relationship was consistent with H4, such that identification as a depressed person was 
associated with reduced wellbeing (β = -.26, p<.001) and indirectly mediated the negative 
relationship between discrimination and wellbeing (β = -.11, CI: -.18, -.05).  
A sensitivity analysis was conducted to investigate the most plausible alternative 
model, specifically that people with more severe depression symptoms perceive themselves to 
more prototypical of the group (ingroup self-stereotyping) and subsequently come to identify 
more strongly as depressed. However, this model was not supported by the data: depression 
severity did not predict ingroup self-stereotyping (β=.01, p=.254) and ingroup self-
stereotyping did not mediate the relationship between depression severity and identification 
(β=.00, CI: -.01, .01).  
Hypothesis five, concerning the moderating role of symptom norms, was tested using 
Hayes PROCESS (2012, model 14). The interaction between identity centrality and symptom 
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norms in predicting wellbeing was significant, t(245)=3.19, p=.002, β=.16. Specifically, 
among those who were below the median (and the mid-point of the scale) in their 
identification as depressed, there was no relationship between symptom norms and one’s own 
wellbeing (t(100)=.79, p=.430). That is, people who did not identify as depressed were not 
influenced by the symptom norms of depressed people. Among those above the median, 
however, these was a significant relationship between symptom norms and wellbeing (t(146)= 
4.47, p < .001). This was such that among people who identified as depressed, there was an 
association such that the more they characterized depressed people in terms of depression 
symptomatology, the poorer their own wellbeing. Therefore, H5 was confirmed – identifying 
as depressed was harmful to wellbeing because it facilitated convergence towards norms of 
depressogenic thoughts and behaviors.  
Discussion 
This study is the first to quantitatively demonstrate that social identification as 
mentally ill is associated with the experience of discrimination and poorer wellbeing. 
Furthermore, out of dozens of extant studies of social identity and wellbeing (for reviews, see 
Cruwys et al., 2014b; Jetten, Haslam, Haslam, Dingle, & Jones, 2014), this is the first to find 
a direct negative relationship between these two variables. It has previously been theorized, 
however, that there are conditions under which social identification could harm wellbeing 
(Cruwys et al., 2014b), specifically in the context of stigmatized group membership or group 
norms that proscribe activities harmful to wellbeing. Therefore, rather than being a 
disconfirmation of the social identity approach to health (including the rejection identification 
model), we see these results as providing evidence for boundary conditions under which the 
psychological resources provided by social identity become toxic to health.  
These data also have implications for the way in which we conceptualize social 
relationships and group membership. That is, it is the subjective psychological connection 
with a group – social identification – and not one’s official category membership that matters 
for mental health. All of the participants in the current study were, objectively speaking, part 
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of the social category “depressed people”, and yet it was only those who self-defined as such 
who were subject to potentially harmful social influence processes from fellow depressed 
persons.  This was borne out by the qualitative results, where those who accepted the 
depression identity label emphasized how this identity shaped their behavior. Relatedly, these 
data provide further evidence for the importance of identity content. In a recent related study, 
Cruwys and colleagues (2014a) found that depressed people who socially identified with 
recreational groups or psychotherapy groups experienced reduced depression symptoms over 
time. While this might, on the surface, appear to be a comparable sample with contrary results 
to those reported here, the norms of recreational or psychotherapy groups are critically 
different from those of “depressed people”, and thus their consequences for mental health 
diverge.   
It is interesting to note that the reverse pathway, whereby the experience of 
depression symptoms leads to self-stereotyping and subsequent self-definition, was not 
supported by these data. This pathway does, however, remain a plausible means through 
which a depression identity might develop over time in a sub-clinical sample. This might 
have historically occurred in the present sample, however, this could not explain the observed 
differences in wellbeing. It is worth noting also that previous research investigating the role 
of ingroup self-stereotyping also concluded that it follows from, rather than precedes, 
identification and wellbeing (Latrofa et al. 2009). Nevertheless, a limitation of this study is its 
correlational nature, and no reverse causal pathway can be confidently ruled out here.  
These data are relevant to the ongoing debate regarding the clinical impact of 
diagnosis. We do not dispute the benefits of diagnosis for guiding formulation and treatment. 
Nevertheless, these findings suggest that diagnosis, to the extent that it contributes to patients’ 
self-definition in terms of their mental illness, may have harmful consequences for wellbeing. 
Going beyond our data somewhat, but in keeping with social-psychological theory, we posit 
that when a mental illness diagnosis is disclosed to a patient, it ought to be accompanied by 
information that a) challenges the legitimacy of stigma towards people with mental illness, 
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and b) encourages patients to see mental illness as a temporary state, rather than a permanent 
condition. This combination may limit negative effects and enable patients to engage in 
strategies of individual mobility, that is, recovery efforts.  
A further implication for clinical practice is that, while interventions to boost social 
engagement are very much indicated, attention is needed to the normative content of these 
groups. Illness support groups, including online communities, have the potential to be 
harmful if they encourage patients to adopt an illness identity that is framed in permanent, 
biochemical terms, or to engage in collective rumination (see also Howard, 2006; Kvaale et 
al., 2013). Instead, clinicians should seek to provide alternative, positive sources of self-
definition around which social identities might cohere, which might include recreational or 
community groups (e.g. Cruwys et al., 2014a; Gleibs, Haslam, Haslam, & Jones, 2011; 
Gleibs, Haslam, Jones, et al., 2011).  
In sum, these data are the first to show, in a large international sample of depressed 
persons, that identifying as mentally ill is related to the experience of stigma and with poorer 
wellbeing. These data are also the first to provide evidence of a theorized, but to date 
hypothetical, boundary condition for the benefits of social identification for wellbeing. 
Identifying as depressed enables a process of social influence, whereby people are more likely 
to converge upon the norms of the in-group: in this case, thoughts and behavior that are 
depressogenic. In this way, the stigma of depression poses a double burden – not only through 
its direct harm to health, but also by bolstering mental illness identity and its associated ills. 
New directions in depression treatment should ideally establish methods of empowering 
people to recover from depression without the need to accept or enact an illness label. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations.  
N = 250. 
 M SD Range Correlations         
    1.  2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.  
1. Depression 24.92 9.82 2-42 -          
2. Anxiety 16.50 9.31 0-42 .48* -         
3. Stress 23.45 9.02 0-42 .57* .61* -        
4. Life satisfaction 15.83 7.03 5-32 -.47* -.12 -.24* -       
5. Identity solidarity 4.36 1.34 1-7 .15 .24* .18* .01 -      
6. Identity satisfaction 3.61 1.67 1-7 .08 .28* .14* .03 .66* -     
7. Identity centrality 4.23 1.44 1-7 .29* .25* .30* -.18* .40* .34* -    
8. Identity self-stereotyping 4.24 1.38 1-7 .07 .14* .10 -.05 .40* .33* .37* -   
9. Identity homogeneity 4.04 1.39 1-7 .07 .12 .02 -.04 .40* .39* .31* .69* -  
10. Discrimination 3.71 1.55 1-7 .26* .27* .21* -.17* .29* .22* .41* .25* .22* - 
11. Symptom norms 5.56 0.99 1-7 .24* .12 .11 -.19* .20* .01 .16* .11 .14* .08 
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Figure 1. The centrality of depression to one’s identity was associated with poorer wellbeing, 
particularly along those who thought that depression symptoms characterized people with 
depression.  
NB. Standardized beta values are included in the figure and in text to aid interpretability, 
however, significance levels were calculated using unstandardized values in Hayes 
PROCESS models 4 and 14, in accordance with recommendations (Hayes & Preacher 2013).  
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Footnotes 
                                                        
1
 Factor analysis indicated a three-factor solution of social identification was the best fit for 
these data. The first factor corresponded to the centrality subscale; the second factor consisted 
of an ‘entitativity’ dimension made up of self-stereotyping and homogeneity; and the third 
factor was made up of solidarity plus satisfaction. Given that our results focus on the identity 
centrality subscale, the coherence of which is supported by both the factor analysis and the 
extant literature, we retained the five-factor model for our analyses in keeping with published 
recommendations (Leach et al., 2008).  
 
2
 Note that these findings also held when the wellbeing measures were assessed separately, 
such that for depression, stress and life satisfaction the results were identical. For anxiety, 
identity satisfaction, rather than identity centrality, was the significant mediator.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Highlights 
 
 Identification with a group, even a stigmatized group, is protective for 
wellbeing 
 These relationships have not been tested in the context of mental illness 
identity 
 We surveyed 250 people with depression from 23 countries 
 Identifying as depressed predicted lower wellbeing 
 Identifying as depressed predicted conforming to the norms of depressed 
people 
 
 
